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 The various lecture notes transcribed by students in Kant’s classroom have become an 
invaluable resource for scholars working in all areas of Kant’s philosophy. Although various 
editions of the notes have been in existence in German for, in some cases, almost two centuries, 
the collection of the notes within Kant’s Gesammelte Schriften in the second half of the twentieth 
century, and the translation of a selection as part of the Cambridge Edition of the Works of 
Immanuel Kant has all but assigned them the status of core texts within Kant’s corpus. Indeed, 
one would be hard pressed to find an instance in recent scholarship where reference is not made 
to the notes in one way or another. At the same time, in the contemporary literature one rarely 
finds scholarship that takes the lecture notes as the primary object of investigation; albeit for 
good reason, the notes are most often used as supporting material. This volume takes a different 
approach. Part of Cambridge’s Critical Guide series, the book is an excellent and expansive 
discussion of a variety of issues raised in Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy and promises to 
strengthen discussion of their content in the future. In the following, after briefly discussing the 
introduction and the structure of the book, I summarize the main argument of each of its 15 
contributions and I conclude with a few critical remarks. 
 The first and most important thing to note about this volume is that it restricts itself to the 
four sets of lecture notes contained in the Cambridge translation of Kant’s Lectures on Ethics, 
namely Herder, Collins, Mrongovius II, and Vigilantius. With some important qualifications 
(which I discuss at the end of this review), this is not necessarily a negative limitation of the 
volume: these four sets of notes were chosen for the Cambridge translation because they stem 
from four different time periods - the 1760s (Herder), the 1770s (Collins), the 1780s 
(Mrongovius II), and the 1790s (Vigilantius) - and therefore uniquely illuminate the various 
stages of the development of Kant’s moral philosophy.  
 The chapters are organized into three parts, each containing five essays. Part I fulfills the 
promise of the book being a ‘guide’ to Kant’s lectures. A reader inexperienced with the notes 
will have questions about their reliability, their origin, their authors, etc. and these chapters 
clarify all such questions. In the first chapter, Kant’s lectures on ethics and Baumgarten’s moral 
philosophy, Stefano Bacin argues that the two textbooks Kant used as the basis for his lectures 
on moral philosophy, Alexander Baumgarten’s Initia philosophiae practicae primae and Ethica 
Philosophica, illuminate the structure and progression of Kant’s discussion in his lectures, even 
in those places where it is not obvious that Baumgarten is under discussion. Bacin also suggests 
that some of Kant’s terminology comes from Baumgarten, for example the concept of 
«constraint» (coactio or Zwang) (p. 19). Bacin illustrates that an important contrast between 
Kant and Baumgarten concerns the foundation of morality, which for Baumgarten is ultimately 
based on natural theology, as well as their systems of ethical obligations, where for Baumgarten 
duties to God have priority (see p. 29f.). Bacin’s chapter is essential reading for those seeking to 
understand the context of Kant’s lectures and is one of the best in the volume. 
 The next four chapters are each devoted to one of the four sets of lecture notes translated 
in the Cambridge edition. Patrick Frierson’s chapter, Herder: religion and moral motivation, is 
an excellent illustration of how reading the lectures can help illuminate Kant’s development. 
Frierson shows that during the 1760s, Kant’s understanding of the role of religion in moral 
motivation was significantly different from his Critical position. For example, although even at 
this time Kant thinks that the moral motive must be «pure», religion can be an aid to acting 
morally, and in fact motivation is not as perfect as it could be if the religious motive is not also 
present. As such, Frierson argues that at this time Kant endorsed the possibility of mixed 
motives. Although there are many topics in the Herder notes that still to be explored, for example 
Kant’s argument for the existence of disinterested benevolence (see 27:3ff.), this chapter 
provides an excellent example of how Kant’s early ethics are different from his mature views. 
 Manfred Kuehn’s chapter, Collins: Kant’s proto-critical position, begins with a nice 
overview of some issues with using this set of notes over the Kaehler notes from the same 
period, an issue I return to at the end of this review. He then argues, similar to Frierson, that in 
Collins religion plays a different role in Kant’s early period, namely as a possible source of 
moral motivation. Kuehn then illustrates how reading Collins is useful for understanding the later 
Doctrine of Virtue. Kuehn shows, for example, that Kant gradually came to view duties to self as 
more important than duties to others. Collins also classifies the duty of truthfulness as a duty to 
others, not as a duty to self as it is in Kant’s later work. Kuehn includes an important discussion 
of Kant’s conception of the principle of morality in these notes. While he had not yet discovered 
the categorical imperative, Kuehn points out that even during the mid 1770s, Kant believed the 
principle must be objective and necessary, even though he describes it as neither «categorical» 
nor «unconditional».  
The aim of Jens Timmermann’s article, Mrongovius II: a supplement to the Groundwork 
of the Metaphysics of Morals, is to show that many central ideas in the Groundwork are present 
in the Mrongovius II notes. Examples include the idea of the good will as unconditionally 
valuable, the notion of imperatives, the contrast between the value of moral action and the value 
of happiness, the problem with contradictory maxims, and the role of autonomy. Continuing with 
the a theme of the previous two chapters, Timmermann also points out that religion is meant to 
reassure agents that virtue is rewarded with happiness in the next life. This set of notes is 
important because it likely stems from the Winter of 1784/5, i.e. around the same time as the 
Groundwork, and Timmermann does an excellent job illustrating how the notes clarify and 
expand on portions of Kant’s published thought. 
The final essay in Part I, Robert Louden’s Vigilantius: morality for humans, argues that 
as opposed to the pure moral philosophy we are familiar with from Kant’s main published works, 
Vigilantius takes a direct interest in humanity, an approach distinct from even the Metaphysics of 
Morals where pure morality is applied to human beings. Louden illustrates that Vigilantius 
discusses the life of virtue as one of struggle, where morality must trump desire even though 
humanity can never be rid of desire. Louden therefore sees Kant as offering an alternative to 
Schiller here that is clearer than in the published works: rather than virtue consisting in the 
alignment of morality and desire, Kant claims that an essential part of being human is to have 
this conflict between morality and desire. Were this conflict to be overcome, as Schiller 
proposes, we would to lose the human condition. Louden also points out that in these notes 
morality leads to religion and not vice versa, and at this point in his development there is no 
place for duties to God. 
The remaining chapters of the volume engage with a theme or topic rather than a single 
set of notes. In Ancient insights in Kant’s conception of the highest good, Stephen Engstrom 
argues that Kant’s notion of the highest good is closer to that of the ancients than Kant leads us 
to believe. In particular, referring primarily to the Collins notes Engstrom argues that Kant’s 
conception of the highest good reveals that he reserved an important place for happiness in his 
moral philosophy, even during the pre-Critical period. Engstrom also makes the notable 
observation that Kant’s discussion of the good will in the Groundwork corresponds to the 
discussion of the highest good in Collins.  
Allen Wood’s essay Kant’s history of ethics continues the theme of the previous essay 
and argues that, especially in his lectures, Kant understood his approach to ethics largely in 
relation to his historical predecessors. After an interesting section suggesting that Kant’s 
philosophy is less ahistorical than we often assume, Wood argues that Kant viewed modern 
ethics as one of principles, as opposed to the ancient ethics of being. He shows that Kant thought 
that all modern approaches to the principle of morality are nonetheless false in that they are 
heteronomous, as is clear from Kant’s tables in the Groundwork and second Critique. Wood 
points out that Kant criticizes both ancient and Christian ethics in the lectures for proposing an 
ideal; for Kant this is a mistake because it risks human beings adapting, i.e. weakening, the 
commands of morality to suit inherent human weakness. 
In Moral obligation and free will Oliver Sensen illustrates that the concept of obligation 
is fundamental to Kant’s moral philosophy, and he argues this is especially clear in Kant’s 
various lecture notes. Sensen illustrates that obligation, for Kant, is a kind of necessitation in that 
it implies constraint and compulsion. This kind of necessitation is distinct from (pre-) 
determination, however, and this is how such necessitation is compatible with freedom, which 
Sensen argues must be understood in the sense that human beings are first causes, i.e. self-moved 
movers. Sensen also offers a comprehensive discussion of the reason why Kant views his 
autonomous moral theory as distinct from all other heteronomous version, namely because all 
heteronomous theories in their own way view obligation as dependent upon desires external to 
the will. Sensen even provides an analysis of whether Kant’s classification of moral theories is 
exhaustive from a contemporary point of view: Sensen argues that it is, and therefore that Kant’s 
moral theory is unique among the contemporary options of moral realism, naturalism, and others. 
The last two articles of Part II, B. Sharon Byrd’s The elusive story of Kant’s permissive 
laws and Joachim Hruschka’s On the logic of imputation in the Vigilantius lecture notes, speak 
to the volume’s comprehensiveness in that they discuss topics related to the Doctrine of Right 
rather than Kant’s moral philosophy proper, but which are nonetheless present in the lectures on 
moral philosophy (and primarily in Vigilantius). Byrd argues that there are no more than three 
kinds of permissive laws in Kant’s philosophy, namely those describing exceptions to 
prohibitions, exceptions to prescriptions, and those capturing power-conferring norms. She gives 
reason to suggest these three kinds have roots in Achenwall, and claims that they can all be 
found in both the lectures and the published writings, contrary to what some commentators 
suggest. Byrd does an excellent job explaining what each kind of permissive law amounts to, but 
most importantly she finds examples in various places in Kant’s writings, which immensely help 
elucidate the three kinds. Hruschka then discusses the distinction between imputation of an act 
(imputatio facti), i.e. «the judgement through which someone is seen as the author of a certain 
act», and imputation of the law (imputatio legis), i.e. «the application of the law to this act, or the 
subsumption of the act under the law» (p. 170-1). He shows that Kant’s discussion of imputation 
falls in a tradition started by Pufendorf and continued by Baumgarten and Achenwall, where 
there is a difference between a deed and an act, such that only a deed is considered the effect of a 
author as a free cause, and therefore can be imputed to an author. The essay also makes the 
important contribution of explaining why imputation of the law drops out of Kant’s mature 
conception of imputation, namely because Kant considers it to be only a small, special case of 
imputation more generally. 
The five essays in Part III deal with topics in normative ethics and therefore correspond 
most closely to the subjects of the Doctrine of Virtue. In the first essay of this part, Freedom, 
ends, and the derivation of duties in the Vigilantius notes, Paul Guyer argues that in Vigilantius 
in particular, «all classes of duty», i.e. both negative and positive duties to self and others, «can 
all be derived from the concept of freedom combined with some basic facts about the human 
condition that bear on the realization of freedom» (p. 190). On Guyer’s reading, negative duties 
avoid the restriction of freedom and positive duties expand freedom. His essay closes with the 
suggestion that friendship and marriage involve the promotion of freedom, an interesting view 
that merits further discussion. 
In Proper self-esteem and duties to oneself, Lara Denis looks at Collins, Vigilantius, and 
the Metaphysics of Morals and distinguishes between five senses of self-esteem in Kant: «a way 
of estimating one’s worth; an opinion … of one’s worth; a feeling of worth; and a principle and 
an attitude concerning one’s worth» (p. 206), her analysis of the last being particularly 
illuminating. Her main argument is that there is an instructive, though inessential, link between 
self-esteem and duties to oneself: perfect duties to oneself can be construed as preserving both a 
proper estimation of oneself and a respect for the humanity in our own person, and imperfect 
duties to oneself as increasing our perfection and therefore expressing our esteem for ourselves. 
Denis closes with the interesting suggestion that Kant links these two concepts and emphasizes 
self-esteem as a feeling more in the lecture notes primarily because he is there concerned with 
the moral education of his audience. 
Anne Margaret Baxley, in her essay Virtue, self-mastery, and the autocracy of practical 
reason, argues that virtue, for Kant, is not mere continence or prudential self-control, but is 
moral strength of will in the sense of the capacity to withstand temptation to transgression of the 
moral law. Virtue is therefore a kind of self-mastery, and in line with her excellent book (see 
Baxley 2010) Baxley argues that virtue is also best understood as autocracy, i.e. the executive 
power to choose what duty requires despite impediments. In line with Louden’s article, Baxley 
also insists that conflict or struggle is an essential aspect of the virtuous life, according to Kant. 
In Love, Jeanine Grenberg argues that Kant assigns a larger if not more important role to 
love in the lectures notes than he does in the Critical works. She illustrates that, according to 
Kant, we can only love others once we love ourselves, i.e. take care of our own well-being. She 
also notes how Kant advocates a degree of indifference, rather than love, towards others. This is 
because love of others makes us prone to be more concerned with the judgement of others rather 
than with how we view ourselves in our own eyes. Grenberg also discusses Kant’s analysis of 
the religious injunction to love one’s neighbour as oneself, and claims that, for Kant, this does 
not command us to simply have a particular feeling or desire, but rather to actually do things of 
practical benefit for others. However, Grenberg’s article contains a curious error: she claims that 
the Collins notes «come mostly from 1784» (p. 248), even though as both Kuehn (p. 51) and the 
editors themselves explain (p. 3-4), the notes were only transcribed around this time and likely 
stem from around 1775. 
In the last essay of the volume, Love of honour, emulation, and the psychology of the 
devilish vices, Housten Smit and Mark Timmons seek to explain the nature of the devilish vices, 
i.e. ingratitude, envy, and Schadenfreude, and how individuals succumb to them. They illustrate 
that each vice in its own way arises from our inborn tendency to be opposed to the superiority of 
others, and they tentatively suggest that the vices are psychologically unified in the sense that 
they each involve other-directed hatred. This is a rich article and other interesting sections are 
Smit and Timmons’ discussion of Kant’s distinction between true love of honour and the desire 
of honour, as well as their account of Kant’s discussion of emulation. 
I conclude with two remarks. First, as a number of the contributors rightly point out (see 
p. xiv, 2, 52) Collins is no longer taken to be the most accurate set of notes belonging to the 
group of similar notes stemming from the mid-1770s. Most reliable are the Kaehler notes (see 
Stark 2004), which Werner Stark has persuasively argued is superior to Collins in a variety of 
respects (see Stark 1999). For this reason, the contributors to this volume often refer to Kaehler 
instead of Collins. The Collins notes therefore have a somewhat ambivalent status in this 
volume: they are both a central focus of many essays and are at the same time regarded by most 
of the contributors as somewhat unreliable. Collins remains a central focus of this volume, of 
course, because they and not Kaehler are translated in the Cambridge edition of Kant’s Lectures 
on Ethics. Thus, despite the overall impression one gets from the volume of Collins’ reliability, 
as well as J.B. Schneewind’s reassurance in the Forward that «readers who do not use Kaehler 
can use Collins … to get as good an idea as we can have of what Kant told his students» (p. xv), 
readers should take seriously the reservations many contributors have for relying too heavily on 
Collins. It is worth mentioning, however, that the editors made the excellent decision of having 
Kuehn write the essay on Collins, for Kuehn himself wrote the introduction to German edition of 
the Kaehler notes (see Kuehn 2004) 
My second and final remark concerns Mrongovius II. Timmerman’s article in this 
volume is indispensable for anyone wishing to read this set of notes – whether in translation or 
from the academy edition – because he points out a number of transcription errors in the 
Academy edition and which therefore bleed over into the Cambridge translation (see p. 68-9, 
especially notes 3 and 5). In fact, after reading Timmermann’s contribution, one is tempted to not 
bother reading Mrongovius II at all, especially in translation. As Timmermann says in a footnote: 
«If you are interested in what Mrongovius has to say, sell your copy of the Lectures on Ethics 
and spend the money on a ticket to Gdansk» (p. 69n), which is where the lecture transcripts are 
preserved. Timmerman himself uses his own copy of the notes, thus one can at least trust the 
analysis given in his chapter. Indeed, these two remarks should not negatively reflect on the 
volume as a whole. On the contrary, that there are issues with the notes that form the basis of the 
Cambridge translations only makes this volume that much more indispensible: without it, readers 
are at risk of failing to appreciate both the philological and philosophical issues surrounding 
Kant’s lectures on moral philosophy. 
 
Michael Walschots 
University of St. Andrews 
 
 
References: 
 
Baxley, Anne Margaret. Kant’s Theory of Virtue: The Value of Autocracy. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2010. 
Kuehn, Manfred. ‘Einleitung’ in Immanuel Kant, Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie. Edited by 
Werner Stark. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004. 
Stark, Werner. (Ed.) Immanuel Kant, Vorlesung zur Moralphilosophie. Berlin: De Gruyter, 2004.  
 -- ‘Zu Kants Moralkolleg der 1770er Jahre. Die Relevanz der wiederentdeckten 
Nachschrift Kaehler.’ In 
und ihrem Umkreis. Tagung aus Anlaß des 60. Geburtstags von Reinhard Brandt. Edited 
by Heiner F Klemme, Bernd Ludwig, Michael Pauen, and Werner Stark. Würzburg: 
Königshausen & Neumann, 1999. 
 
 
